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ABSTRACT 
Mobile devices, such as phones, tablets and laptops, expose businesses and governments to a multitude of information 
security risks. While Information Systems research has focused on the security and privacy aspects from the end-user 
perspective regarding mobile devices, very little research has been conducted within corporate environments. In this work, 
thirty-two mobile devices were returned by employees in a global Fortune 500 company. In the empirical analysis, a number 
of significant security risks were uncovered which may have led to leakage of valuable intellectual property or exposed the 
organization to future legal conflicts. The research contribution is an initial empirical report highlighting examples of 
corporate policy breaches by users along with providing a foundation for future research on the security risks of the pervasive 
presence of mobile devices in corporate environments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The mobile device, particularly the smartphone, has become ubiquitous in the information rich corporate environment. 
Annual growth of smartphone use in the corporate environment is reported to be 22% for 2011 (TNS UK Ltd 2011). 
Equipped with a mobile device, employees can access the full range of corporate information and services needed to do their 
job, including emails, business plans, and sales data or customer profiles without the need to ever enter the office. However, 
the very ubiquity of information availability creates the potential for inappropriate information leakage, should a mobile 
device be lost, accessed or stolen.  
The diverse range of applications installed by default on mobile devices, and the ability to access corporate information from 
both personal and employer issued devices means that the distinction between personal and professional uses of a device is 
becoming blurred. Both of these factors are conducive to security risks within an organization and are of growing concern for 
IT security and corporate compliance departments. To complicate matters, a survey by Goode (2010) Intelligence, in 2009, 
indicates that just under half of their respondents did not have a specific security policy for mobile phones. This is potentially 
a problem since human error is commonly recognized as a source of data loss in publicized incidents (CISCO 2008; Poynter 
2008; WorldPress.com 2009). In addition, the Ponemon Institute (2011) reported survey results indicating that nearly two-
thirds of users store a “significant” amount of personal data on a mobile device. The report also notes that 84% of 
respondents stated that they use the same device for both business and personal applications. The result, as IBM (2011) 
noted, is that mobile devices present complex security risks and management issues to organizations. The issues that these 
devices present to organizations potentially have serious financial implications for businesses. 
This research presents an exploratory empirical case study that broadly investigates information privacy and security from the 
perspective of a large organization. The research examined thirty-two mobile devices issued in a global Fortune 500 
organization, which had been subsequently returned to the organization by the employees. The research contribution is an 
initial empirical report highlighting examples of corporate policy breaches along with providing the foundation for future 
research on the security risks of mobile devices in corporate environments.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two discusses relevant corporate security policies. Section three presents the 
methodology, project details and artifacts. Section four presents an analysis of the results. Section five discusses related work 
concerning the empirical evaluation of data found on mobile devices. Section six draws conclusions and presents ideas for 
future work.  
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CORPORATE POLICY  
The organization has developed a range of policies covering topics including information exchange, electronic 
communication, usage and salvaging policies. The Information Exchange Policy describes appropriate communication within 
the organization and to external contractors, customers or regulators. Relevant aspects of the policy decreed that all 
confidential or sensitive data must be encrypted; mobile devices may be monitored for inappropriate use; the identity of 
recipients of sensitive or confidential data must be verified; and unauthorized software downloads are not permitted.  
The Electronic Communication Policy includes a discussion of acceptable use of corporate issued Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT). In particular, the policy requires that ICTs should be used to undertake authorized 
business activities and that personal use should be incidental, limited and consistent with good business practices. In addition, 
the policy requires that personal use should not interfere with, impact upon or interrupt the efficient, lawful and ethical 
operation of the business. General guidance offered by the policy is to be polite and use appropriate language, do not 
embarrass the company, and ensure that the recipients of communications are the intended receivers. The document defines a 
multitude of activities that are unacceptable. Some of these inappropriate activities included the unauthorized possession or 
distribution of confidential data; excessive personal use during core working hours; transmitting, accessing, copying or 
storing excessive non-business related data; accessing unauthorized Internet services; and requesting an employee to divulge 
their user id and password.  
The Usage Policy states that mobile devices are tools to be allocated based on need and are not entitlements. The usage 
policy covers eligibility, the acquisition process and general device restrictions, i.e., restrictions on the number of multiple 
devices with the same capabilities.  The usage policy indicates that issued devices are restricted to business activities unless 
there is no alternative. It goes on to indicate that personal calls should be minimized and that the company should be 
reimbursed for the cost of these calls. Premium rate numbers are not allowed unless directly relevant to the business. The 
policy states that devices purchased for group use is permissible. Device reallocation is encouraged to avoid or reduce 
procurement costs. The policy does indicate that employees leaving the organization must return Subscriber Identity Module 
(SIM) cards to their appropriate line manager. It also indicates that misuse of the mobile phones could result in disciplinary 
action. 
A separate Salvaging Policy details the actions that should be taken within the organization for phones that are either no 
longer needed or are not working properly. The policy indicates that it is the responsibility of the user and/or the manager. 
Actions to be taken included the removal of the SIM card from the device and the erasure of the internal memory of the 
device so that all telephone numbers, data, pictures and general contact information is removed prior to recycling. The policy 
has specific instructions for Motorola and Nokia device erasure. The policy provides detailed information on whom to 
contact within the company and outside vendors used for recycling devices. 
METHODOLOGY 
This research is an exploratory case study of security behavior and information privacy on mobile devices in a specific 
organization that considers both official policy and residual information artifacts. The identity of the organization is being 
withheld to ensure anonymity. Preserving anonymity creates an environment where all parties are comfortable presenting 
commercially sensitive data. The case study is an exploratory analysis of a real-world context comparing evidence of actual 
action with stated corporate policy through assimilation into the organization for a period of several months. Exploratory case 
studies help researchers to understand problems in real-world contexts along with identifying future areas of research (Oates 
2006). Based on growing industry dependency on mobile devices, it was hypothesized that mobile devices are not compliant 
with organizational security polices and they are putting organizations at risk. This hypothesis raises several questions for 
investigation: 
 How much corporate information is really at risk on mobile devices?  
 What type of data is being stored on corporate mobile devices?  To what extent are mobile devices being used for personal, 
as opposed to corporate, activities? 
 To what extent are corporate security policies followed by mobile device users? Do current security policies provide 
adequate protection for organizations? 
To address these questions, the data contents of 32 decommissioned mobile devices that had been issued within the 
organization were analyzed. The resulting data was then compared with the existing corporate policies to determine if data 
leakage is potentially an issue within the organization.  
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Project Details 
The acquisition method used in this case study is derived from a larger case study examining resold mobile phones purchased 
from secondary markets (Glisson, Storer, Mayall, Moug and Grispos 2011).  For this work, only a single mobile forensic 
toolkit, XRY Complete Forensic Examiners Kit, was used to acquire data from the devices.  This was a pragmatic decision 
based on the resources available for this case study. A thorough description of the methodology implemented in this research 
is provided to ease comparison with results from future experiments and to identify explicit limitations. The investigation was 
divided into three stages which included acquisition of the mobile phones, processing mobile phones, and artifact analysis. 
Acquisition of Devices 
All of the mobile devices were provided by one organization. The devices consisted of Nokia and Motorola models.  It did 
not include Global Positioning System devices, tablets, laptops, or any other devices with an integrated Global System for 
Mobile Communications capabilities. All of the devices had been issued to employees in the organization and returned for 
replacement or up-grade.  
It is noted that the acquisition method may have created inherent biases in the sample of mobile devices retrieved. The 
decision to restrict data collection to the phones issued to the employees does not catch corporate data that is stored on 
personal phones. Restricting the data collection to issued devices may have excluded popular brands or models issued in 
other organizations. The devices examined did not represent up-to-date technology issued in the organization because the 
devices had been returned after a period of use. It is interesting that the organization re-issues relatively low-end phones 
where possible and does not issue smartphones to all employees primarily for financial motivations. Data capture was 
restricted to a single mobile forensic toolkit.  
Mobile Phone Processing 
Each mobile phone was processed using the mobile forensic toolkit, XRY Complete Forensic Examiners Kit Version 5.5 
(XFEK), in a physically secure office. Two laptops were purchased for the project. One laptop was configured with the 
XFEK toolkit. The other laptop was used to aggregate and analyze the data in a Microsoft Access database. For each device, 
the XFEK toolkit supports some or all of what are referred to as logical, physical decoded and flash data acquisitions. A 
logical acquisition recovers logical objects (e.g. files) from a device file system. The XFEK software requests information 
from the Operating System (OS) and the OS returns active content. A physical acquisition recovers the raw data stored in 
persistent memory on the device, including deleted information. A decoded physical acquisition reconstructs data to provide 
more meaningful information. The flash method copies all data from the source system. As Breeuwsma, et al, (2007) note, 
there is no standard approach to retrieving this type of data. 
The end result is that several different perspectives of each processed device were produced in the case study. The detailed 
process for extracting and organizing the data was as follows: 
1. An initial inspection of the appearance of the device was recorded in the database in order to document any visible 
damage.  
2. A picture was taken of the mobile phone from the front and the back of the mobile phone. The back of the mobile phone 
was captured so that the International Mobile Equipment Identity was visible in the image.  
3. A physical acquisition of the phones was attempted with XFEK. 
4. A logical acquisition of the phone was attempted with XRY. If the logical extraction of the phone was not successful, 
then a generic SIM card was introduced into the handset and both extractions were tried again. A majority of the 
extractions required a generic SIM to be present for the software to work. 
5. A manual inspection of the initial data was conducted after each extraction using the XFEK data reader. This step was 
taken as a precaution against the introduction of illicit data (such as illegal images) into the main data set. If illegal 
images had been discovered on a device at this stage, the hard disk in the laptop could be removed and provided to the 
appropriate authorities. A spare hard disk was also configured with XFEK ready for use should the need arise: thankfully 
this was not necessary. Once checked, the raw extraction results were backed up to an external hard disk and then the 
next device acquisition took place. 
6. The data produced by XFEK was exported to a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet via the conversion capabilities provided by 
the XFEK data reader. 
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7. The spreadsheet data was imported into individual tables in a Microsoft Access 2010 database. The data captured from 
the different types of acquisitions were stored in dedicated tables in a database to maintain consistency with the data 
classification being produced by XFEK.  
8. A backup was made daily and stored on an external USB hard-disk. 
The procedure for the investigation intended to capture as many artifacts from the individual mobile devices as possible while 
attempting to minimize potential data loss. 
Artifact Analysis 
Thirty Nokia’s were examined along with two Motorola mobile phones. The manufacturer and model break down for the 32 
phones discussed in this area of the case study is available in Table 1 - Manufacture and Model. 
Manufacturer Model CNT 
Motorola RAZR V3i 1 
Motorola V550 1 
Nokia 3109c 8 
Nokia 6021 20 
Nokia 6030 1 
Nokia 6300 1 
Table 1. Manufacture and Model 
Over seven thousand artifacts were returned from logical and physical decoded extractions. The investigation revealed: 
 A password was transmitted in clear SMS text.  
 Inappropriate conversations in SMS text messages. 
 Evidence of unencrypted files being transmitted out of the organization contained in an SMS message: “I emailed you the 
file with the info for Recipient Name and a couple of questions. Can you have a look? Also I just noticed that the email 
wasn’t encrypted when I press send. I will be more careful” 
 A Virtual Private Network (VPN) pass-code saved in a contacts entry with the name of the contact given as ‘Vpn’ 
 Inappropriate pictures and videos. 
None of the Nokia or the Motorola phones had password protection or encryption enabled on the devices. The physical 
decoded extraction of the devices produced the largest number of artifacts from this dataset. An overview of the artifacts is 
available in Table 2 – Total Artifacts.  
  Logical Physical Decoded Flash 
Audio Files 847 365 915 
Calendar Files 92 93  
Calls 833 2,901 40 
Contact 1,029 870  
Documents 69 13 50 
Files 1,788 2,242 2,731 
MMS 14   
Notes 5   
Pictures 1,101 552 3,349 
SMS 1,795 752 161 
Task 7 3  
Videos   10 
Total Artifacts 7,580 7,791 7,256 
Table 2. Total Artifacts 
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The results displayed in Table 3 – Deleted Data indicate that the physical extraction performed by the Flash procedure 
retrieved more deleted data than the procedure used in the Physical Decoded extraction. In areas where XFEK did not find 
deleted data, it appears to not have been allocated a column in the data output. 
One e-mail password was asked for by what appears to be a fellow employee. The email password was provided in the 
responding text message. That text message was also sent with another message telling the receiver that the password is all 
lowercase. Further, the conversation content acknowledges that an employee of the organization lost a laptop with the 
explanation that it was possibly left on a train. 
Potentially inappropriate conversations ranged from discussions about individual user’s parents to sexual references. For 
example, there were 72 references to Mom and Dad in the logical extractions and 9 in the physical extraction. There were 
five text messages with inappropriate explicit sexual references. Only two of these messages were marked as deleted. In the 
Physical Flash pictures table in the database, two phones out of the collection contained images labeled with dates. 
 Physical Decoded Deleted Physical Decoded Flash Deleted Flash 
Audio Files 365 No Column 915 520 
Calendar Files 93 3 - - 
Calls 2,901 512 40 No Column 
Contact 870 159 - - 
Docs 13 No Column 50 0 
Files 2,242 449 2,731 2,131 
Pictures 552 No Column 3,349 2,243 
SMS 752 206 161 137 
Task 3 No Column - - 
Videos - - 10 3 
Total Artifacts 7,791 1,329 7,256 5,034 
Table 3. Deleted Data 
One phone contained 45 Joint Photographic Group (JPGs) that were labeled with a date. Out of the 45 JPGs that were 
returned in the query, five had been deleted. A visual examination of the data revealed that several of the images were of a 
baby, females and a male. Two of these pictures included a female breast feeding the baby. The other device that contained a 
JPG, named with a date, appears to be a very blurry image of a woman’s breast. The image had been deleted on the device. 
XFEK identified 10 items in the video table. All of these items originated from the same device. Out of these items, three 
contained the same MD5 hash. Of the remaining seven videos, only three could be viewed and one was of a strip tease. 
RESULTS ANALYSIS 
The results from a relatively small sample size indicate that there are issues that need to be resolved in the organization 
regarding security policy violations. The fact that the logical acquisition method retrieved over a thousand contacts is, in 
itself, worrying. This is not only a security violation from the perspective that employees are supposed to ensure that they 
have removed all information from the device before returning it to the organization as stated in the Salvaging Policy, but it 
creates the risk of employees being targeted for the data on their mobile device. For example, if an employee is known to 
work in a certain section of the organization, they could be targeted to acquire contact information on senior management. 
This contact information can then be used in social engineering attacks.  
The exchange of an email password via an SMS message is a clear breach of the Electronic Communications Policy 
summarized in the Corporate Policy section. To complicate matters, the reason the individual was requesting the information 
was due to a lost laptop. This highlights the need for all data on mobile devices to be encrypted as is required in the 
Information Exchange Policy. The references to inappropriate conversations and to language also violate the Information 
Exchange Policy. The strip tease video and the personal pictures, of what are presumably family members and friends of the 
employees, also violates both the Information Exchange Policy and the Electronic Communications Policy. While these 
violations are not especially serious security concerns, they could be of potential embarrassment for any organization. The 
references to ‘Mum’, ‘Dad’ and ‘Wife’ indicate that the mobile devices are, potentially, not being used in compliance with 
policies that require personal usage be kept to a minimum. It also raises the question of how much the personal usage is 
costing the organization. Are employees reimbursing the organization for these text messages? 
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The initial results of this case study generated a review of the organization’s existing security polices in reference to the 
mobile devices that will be available to employees in the future. It has also initiated a discussion around the issue of mobile 
devices that are used by multiple users. A common example is a mobile device that is used by a support team and used by the 
employee who is on-call for a particular period of time and then gives the mobile device to the next person on-call. When 
there is a security policy violation, how does the organization enforce an acceptable use policy for this group of users? In this 
scenario, how does the organization ensure that they have identified the appropriate perpetrator?  
The data in this case study examined phones that were issued or approved for and purchased by the organization. With the 
continued blurring of the lines between work related and personal activities, it is only a matter of time before employees start 
inquiring about the use of personal mobile devices in their organizations. The security issues that this introduces include: 
 Who owns the data once it has been transferred to a non-corporate device? 
 Does an organization have the right to monitor an employee’s activities on a personal device? 
 If an investigation needs to take place, does the organization have the legal right to search a privately owned device? 
 How does the organization mandate the level of security maintained on the device? 
 How does the company minimize data leakage when employees leave the organization? 
Prior to this case study the organization did not have a policy explicitly detailing how to handle a mobile phone or internal 
general device investigation. The results of this case study contributed to the content of a series of new investigation policies, 
standards and guidelines. The new documentation defines the stakeholders and identifies their roles in the investigation 
process. They address the broad topics of acquisition of the evidence, establishing and maintaining the integrity of the chain 
of custody, the storage of the source hardware and data, storage of the target data and reports, along with decommissioning of 
all hardware and data at the conclusion of the investigation so that it is in compliance with retention legislation. 
RELATED WORK 
An investigation into mobile computing within the Information Systems (IS) discipline indicates that there are relatively few 
papers on the security of mobile devices, compared with other areas of research in information systems (Ladd, Datta, Sarker 
and Yu 2010). It also indicates that there is a lack of research in the area of “Mobile Cases and Applications” (Ladd et al. 
2010) which specifically examines organizational and societal change and the impact when mobile devices are deployed in 
organizations. The survey demonstrates that security of mobile devices in corporate environments is an issue which needs to 
be considered as part of an overall business model.  
Business models are continuously evolving with the on-going integration of mobile devices into the work environment. 
Previous research indicates that the boundaries between work and non-work related activities are continuing to blur (Hislop 
and Axtell 2011). It has been suggested that business models are changing due to the continued proliferation of mobile 
devices (Lindgren, Taran and Saughaug 2011). They argue that businesses will need to consider models that address the 
physical, the digital and the virtual dimensions of the organization. However, it does not discuss the security risk that this 
evolution introduces to organizations.  
Several broad security issues have been highlighted with the introduction of cloud computing as a way to enhance mobile 
computing capabilities (Kumar and Lu 2010). However, these issues are applicable to all types of mobile users and do not 
address issues that are specific to small scale mobile device users. In particular, anti-virus software is becoming an 
increasingly important issue for these devices. It has been noted that anti-virus software is becoming more prevalent for  
mobile devices (Thing, Subramaniam, Tsai and Chua 2011). They also developed a tool that is a loadable kernel module, 
monitoring Operating System (OS) calls on an Android operating system (Thing et al. 2011). When the OS makes calls to 
services to access sensitive data, this activity is detected and the tool records the system calls and presents an alert on the 
device interface. The papers discussed do not consider critical issues related to mobile devices from a digital forensics 
perspective or how these issues relate to the corporate environment. Much of the existing work does not utilize empirical data 
from industry to support their analyses. These investigations, naturally, have an impact on information privacy.  
Even though it has been noted that privacy research dates back to the 1960s and 1970s (Smith and Milberg 1996), there is 
still, a great debate on exactly how to define privacy (Smith, Dinev and Xu 2011). Privacy has been defined as “the interest 
that individuals have in sustaining a personal space, free from interference by other people and organizations” (Clarke 1999). 
He goes on to define four privacy elements which included the person, personal behavior, personal communication and 
personal data. The idea has been put forth that the digitization of communications in today’s societies encourages the merger 
of communication privacy and data privacy into what can be termed information privacy (Belanger and Crossler 2011). Even 
though there are several definitions of information privacy, these definitions typically entail personal control over the 
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secondary use of personal information (Belanger and Crossler 2011; Belanger, Hiller and Smith 2002; Stone, Gueutal, 
Gardner and McClure 1983). It is interesting that the concept of privacy in research is taken largely from that of an 
individual.  
Research indicates that many researchers focus on the apprehensions that individuals have regarding the privacy practices of 
organizations (Belanger and Crossler 2011). However, they do not talk about researching privacy from the perspective of an 
organization. Privacy research can be classified on levels of analysis which have been defined as societal, organizational 
group and individual (Smith et al. 2011). However, a large portion of the research is from the view point of securing personal 
information. While specific research highlights that mobile devices present technical opportunities for security breaches and 
malicious activities along with identifying investigative challenges (Grispos, Glisson and Storer 2013), there is minimum 
research that focuses on organizational privacy on mobile devices.  
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The increase in mobile subscriptions coupled with the continued ubiquitous integration of mobile devices as a prominent 
means of communications in technologically advanced societies creates environments conducive to security vulnerabilities. 
The initial study indicates that mobile phones are putting organizations at risk. The amount of corporate information that is 
really at risk on mobile devices is potentially substantial. The number of artifacts recovered from logical and physical 
extractions, as noted in Tables 2 and 3, gives an indication of the scale of this problem. It also indicates that the types of data 
stored on corporate mobile devices include corporate and personal information. The case study reveals that corporate security 
policies, followed by mobile device users, are clearly being violated. The initial analysis indicates that current security 
policies are in place; however, the challenge appears to be the enforcement of policies within this organization. 
Future work must address how organizations can minimize risk when utilizing mobile technologies. Short-term solutions 
include security policy revisions to improve coverage of new technologies and services, as well as to encourage compliance. 
Potential difficulties arise from cultural resistance to new policies and technical implementations in different environments. 
These issues need to be investigated from both technical and socio-technical viewpoints.  
One solution to these compliance challenges may be the implementation of real-time corporate device monitoring software. 
This software could have functionality in the form of notifications when inappropriate language is being sent or received via 
SMS, MMS or emails. Other areas of future research include exploratory research into the development and implementation 
of mobile phone anti-forensics software, empirically researching the proliferation of viruses on corporate mobiles and 
detecting the use of public and private clouds on mobile devices. 
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